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WHOM MUST THE CLERGY PROTECT?
THE INTERESTS OF AT-RISK CHILDREN IN
CONFLICT WITH CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION: DUTIES IN CONFLICT
Three defendants, all professional spiritual counselors, were con-
victed of misdemeanors for failure to report incidents of child abuse as
required by their state's mandatory reporting laws.1 The facts were
disturbing. In one case, a father had beaten his four- and seven-year-
old children. 2 In the other two cases, fathers had sexually abused their
young daughters.3 All three defendants appealed. 4 Each defendant
justified his noncompliance with the reporting statute on religious
grounds.5 They considered themselves ministers and believed their
sincerely held religious convictions bound them to not report the abu-
sive fathers. 6 Because the three defendants worked in the same
church, and because the cases presented similar fact patterns, the
state's court of appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed the con-
victions.7 The state's supreme court, however, affirmed only two of
the defendants' convictions, but reversed the third.8 The sole basis of
the supreme court's reversal was the third defendant's status as an
ordained member of the clergy, and his acting in that capacity.9 As a
member of the clergy, the court held that there was no mandated duty
to report either an abusive father or the victimization of an eight-year-
old girl 0
1. State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Wash. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1068.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1070.
7. Motherwell, 788 P.2d at 1067-68.
8. Id. at 1067.
9. Id. at 1069.
10. Id. The Washington Supreme Court noted that, prior to 1975, clergymembers were in-
cluded by statute as mandatory reporters. Id. In 1975, however, the legislature removed the
reference to clergy. Id. The court concluded that this deletion in the statute's legislative history
revealed a "clear intent to exempt all [clergymembers] from the statute's mandatory reporting
provision." Id. The court explained the delineation as follows: "Because defendants Motherwell
and Mensonides were not ordained ministers when they first learned of the suspected child
abuse, they do not fall within the exemption. Their convictions are affirmed. Because he was an
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The above cases trace several contours in the problem of mandatory
reporting laws with respect to members of the clergy. In instances of
child abuse and neglect, members of the clergy often face a decision
between two competing goods: that of guarding the privacy and the
spiritual well-being of the penitent parishioner on one hand, and that
of safeguarding the physical and emotional well-being of at-risk chil-
dren on the other."
Privilege in the pastor-penitent context has been a staple of Ameri-
can church life and part of the spiritual experience for people of faith
for centuries.' 2 It is an entrenched practice that has both historic legal
and ecclesiastical underpinnings. 13 All fifty states have codified statu-
tory allowances of one kind or another that make the information dis-
closed to members of the clergy, in their role as such, privileged in
some sense. 14 There is no uniform definition of a clergymember, but
twenty-three states agree that, in essence, a clergymember is "a priest,
minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of
a religious denomination or religious organization."' 5 The existence
of the clergy-penitent privilege reflects the value that society places
on the safeguarding of personal, religious, and spiritual convictions.' 6
ordained minister at all relevant times, Hartley does fall within the exemption. His conviction is
reversed." Id.
11. See Ashley Jackson, Comment, The Collision of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the
Priest-Penitent Privilege, 74 UMKC L. REV. 1057, 1067 (2006) ("[Tihe question becomes
whether the priest-penitent privilege or the affirmative duty to report should control.").
12. For a thorough history of the pastor-penitent privilege, see WILLIAM W. RANKIN, CONFI-
DENTIALITY AND CLERGY: CHURCHES, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 15-45 (1990). Although the issue
is typically placed in the context of Western religions, it need not be. See Chad Horner, Beyond
the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-Penitent Privilege in a Diverse Society, 45 DRAKE L.
REV. 697, 711 (1997).
13. See Horner, supra note 12, at 700 ("[T]he common law was greatly influenced by church
law.").
14. For a summary of each of the fifty states' statutes regarding the pastor-penitent privilege,
see W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 2 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 6:21
(2012). See also RICHARD HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAW 1033-53 (3d ed. 2000).
15. Ronald J. Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent
Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 232 (1998). But see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697-98 (2012). The Court in Hosanna-Tabor held that a
parochial school teacher who had received a "call to religious service" and been commissioned
as a minister was covered by the ministerial exception to the Americans with Disabilities Act,
after using the following four criteria to determine whether the exception applied: (1) her formal
title; (2) the substance reflected in that title; (3) her own use of that title: and (4) the important
religious functions she performed for the Church. Id. This recent decision may have future
bearing on whether religious professionals, not traditionally construed as members of the clergy,
have obligations under mandatory reporting laws.
16. State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1127 (N.J. 2010) ("The privilege 'recognizes the human need
to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be
flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.' Thus, the
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On the other hand, the problem of child abuse and neglect is deeply
troubling and epidemic. In 2006, an estimated 905,000 victims of child
abuse and neglect were identified from over 3.6 million reports re-
ceived by various child protective services agencies. 17 In 2009, 702,000
victims were positively identified in the United States and Puerto Rico
from 3.3 million reports, which alleged that 6 million children were
subject to maltreatment. 18 Maltreatment takes many forms: neglect
(78.3%), physical abuse (17.8%), sexual abuse (9.5%), and psycholog-
ical maltreatment (7.6%). 19 In 2009, an estimated 1,770 children died
from abuse and neglect.2 0
One particular difficulty the data highlight is the relational proxim-
ity of victims to those who harm them.21 Of the victims identified in
2009, over 80% suffered abuse or neglect at the hands of his or her
mother, father, or both.22 The frequent relational proximity between
perpetrators and victims accentuates the importance of active compli-
ance by mandated reporters because they are often in the "best posi-
tion to identify signs of harm to children and to take the steps
necessary to help protect them."'23
Accordingly, in recent years, many states have added members of
the clergy to the lists of those who are considered mandatory report-
underlying rationale for the privilege is the public interest in fostering the cleric-penitent rela-
tionship." (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980))).
17. Amy Chihak, The Nurse's Role in Suspected Child Abuse, 19 PAEDIATRICS AND CHILD
HEALTH S211 (2009).
18. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT
2009, at viii, ix (2010) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/pubs/cm09/cm09.pdf.
19. Id. at ix; for more information on psychological abuse of children, see Jessica Dixon
Weaver, The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal Framework to Capture the
Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 247 (2011) (suggesting the Euro-
pean theory of subsidiarity may offer some way forward in addressing the peculiar problems of
the psychological abuse of children).
20. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 18, at x.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. CHILDREN'S JUSTICE TASK FORCE, ILL. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., MANUAL
FOR MANDATED REPORTERS 3 (rev. ed. 2008) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR MANDATED REPORT-
ERS], available at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/docs/CFS%201050-21 %20Mandated%20Reporter%
20Manual.pdf. The problem of abuse presents a special challenge for child protective services
agencies, like DCFS, because although the home is where most abuse takes place, it is, in ideal
circumstances, the most desirable environment for a child's growth. See id. Child protective
services agencies, therefore, must walk a tightrope between investigation and enforcement to
protect the interests of at-risk children on the one hand, and avoid upsetting the very environ-
ment that is most healthy and suitable for children's development on the other. See id. This
tension thus accentuates the importance of mandatory reporters. Id.
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ers.24 However, there has not been a uniform approach to resolve the
tension between the two competing goods-the privacy of the peni-
tent parishioners and the well-being of the at-risk children-with
which the member of the clergy must wrestle.25 Instead, the fifty
states have dealt with this tension in a variety of ways.2 6 Twenty-three
states include members of the clergy in their list of mandatory report-
ers and protect communications received by the clergymembers in the
context of clergy-penitent privilege. 27 Two states name members of
the clergy as mandated reporters, but do not protect privileged clergy-
penitent communications. 28 Ten states and the District of Columbia
designate specific reporters, but do not include clergymembers on
their lists.29 Yet, other states have provisions in their reporting stat-
utes making "any person" a mandated reporter. Of these states, seven
abrogate the protection ordinarily granted to communications in the
context of clergy-penitent privilege. 30 Another eight "any person"
states protect clergy-penitent communications. 31 All told, only seven
of the fifty sovereign states-New Hampshire, Texas, New Mexico,
24. See, e.g., House of Representatives Transcription Debate, 92nd Gen. Assembly, 135th
Legislative Day, at 17 (statement of Rep. Lyons) (Ill. May 23, 2002), http://www.ilga.gov/house/
transcripts/htrans92/t052302.pdf.
25. Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and
the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2003).
26. See DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 14.
27. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2009); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620 (2010); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-18-402 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.7, 11166 (West 2011); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 19-3-304, 13-90-107 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2011); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4
(2010); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2010); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603 (2004); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 22, § 4011-A (2004 & Supp. 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 21, 51A (2008); MICH.
CoMp. LAWS §§ 722.623, 722.631 (2013); MINN. STAT. §§ 626.556, 595.02 (2009); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-353 (2008); Miss. R. EvID. 505 (2011); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.115, 352.400 (2000
& Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432B.220 (2012); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (LexisNexis 2011 &
Supp. 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 63-7-310, 63-7-420 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913 (West 2007); Wis. STAT.
§ 48.981 (2011).
28. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:29, 169-C:32 (2002); W. VA. CODE §§ 49-6A-2, 49-
6A-7 (2002).
29. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2006); D.C. CODE
§ 4-1321.02 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2008 & Supp.
2012); IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2223 (2011); N.Y. SOCIAL SERVICES
LAW § 413 (McKinney 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-3 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1509 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030 (2010).
30. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.201, 39.204 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2002); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-301, 7B-310 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 40-11-3, 40-11-11 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-605, 37-1-403, 37-1-614 (2010); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2008).
31. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1605 (2009); IND. CODE §§ 31-33-5-1, 34-46-3-1 (2008); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); M.D. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
705 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-711, 28-714. 27-506 (2008 & Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT.
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Rhode Island, Oklahoma, North Carolina, and West Virginia-and
the District of Columbia abrogate the pastor-penitent privilege alto-
gether in cases of child abuse. 32
In 1975, the Illinois legislature enacted the Abused and Neglected
Child Reporting Act (ANCRA), which listed professions required to
report cases of child abuse or neglect.33 In 2002, the legislature
amended ANCRA such that members of the clergy in Illinois were
designated "persons required to report. '34 However, of the over forty
professions listed as mandated reporters by statute, only members of
the clergy are specifically exempted from the reporting requirement
when information concerning child abuse is received in a privileged
context. 35 This is notable because immediately preceding the clergy
exemption, the statute abrogates the privileged quality of communica-
tions involving abused or neglected children for all other mandatory
reporters. 36 In other words, although clergy are included under AN-
CRA, the legislature created a special class of mandated reporter for
ANN. § 32A-4-3 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-
205, 14-3-210, 1-12-101 (2007).
32. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101 ("The requirement to report under this section
applies without exception to an individual whose personal communications may otherwise be
privileged, including an attorney, a member of the clergy, a medical practitioner, a social worker,
a mental health professional, and an employee of a clinic or health care facility that provides
reproductive services." (emphasis added)).
33. See Act effective July 1, 1975, No. 79-65, 1975 Ill. Laws 146 (codified as amended at 325
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010)).
34. See Act effective Aug. 16,2002, No. 92-801, sec. 5, § 4, 2002 Ill. Laws 2737, 2939-40. Three
aspects of the provision for clergymembers as mandated reporters are notable. First, as a conse-
quence of the amendment effected by P.A. 92-801, members of the clergy were not simply added
to the list of mandated reporters, but also set apart in a separate paragraph. See id. Moreover,
that paragraph specifies that the reporting requirement applies to members of the clergy in "his
or her professional capacity." Id. The nuances of that qualification are addressed below in Sec-
tion III.A.l. Finally, the provision for members of the clergy makes reference to the statutory
definition of "abused child" in a manner distinct from all other mandated reporters. See id.
35. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010).
36. North Dakota has a more typically structured exemption:
Any physician, nurse, dentist, optometrist, medical examiner or coroner, or any other
medical or mental health professional, religious practitioner of the healing arts, school-
teacher or administrator, school counselor, addiction counselor, social worker, child
care worker, foster parent, police or law enforcement officer, juvenile court personnel,
probation officer, division of juvenile services employee, or member of the clergy hav-
ing knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect that a child is abused or neglected, or
has died as a result of abuse or neglect, shall report the circumstances to the depart-
ment if the knowledge or suspicion is derived from information received by that person
in that person's official or professional capacity. A member of the clergy, however, is not
required to report such circumstances if the knowledge or suspicion is derived from in-
formation received in the capacity of spiritual adviser.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03 (2008) (emphasis added).
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members of the clergy, with a unique exemption for privileged
communications. 37
This Comment contends that the carve-out for clergy in ANCRA
should be abolished and that other state statutes with similar protec-
tions for pastor-penitent communications should be modified such
that the privilege is abrogated in situations involving child abuse or
neglect.38 Part II of this Comment situates ANCRA in its state and
national contexts.39 Part III analyzes ANCRA and discusses its short-
comings in two areas: (1) problems stemming from ambiguity in the
statute and (2) problems stemming from violations of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses.4 0 Part IV provides an overview of spe-
cific ways in which abolition of the clergy exemption strategically en-
ables clergymembers to play an important role in child protection and
is justified because the interests of at-risk children trump those of pen-
itent abusers. Part V advances the idea that a neutral "any person"
child protection statute, which clearly abrogates all privileges, includ-
ing the clergy-penitent privilege, should be enacted in Illinois and
nationwide.
37. Other amendments added professions to the existing list of mandated reporters. See infra
note 81. In contrast, the 2002 amendment, which made members of the clergy mandated report-
ers, did so by the addition of two new paragraphs. See Act effective Aug. 16, 2002, No. 92-801,
sec. 5, § 4, 2002 Ill. Laws 2737, 2939-40. There are separate paragraphs for other professions,
such as school board members, but these separate paragraphs deal with nuanced situations
under the law, such as ways in which the reporting of school employees should take place. Mem-
bers of the clergy are the only profession to which a separate paragraph is devoted.
38. The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
The privileged quality of communication between any professional person required
to report and his patient or client shall not apply to situations involving abused or
neglected children and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by
this Act.
A member of the clergy may claim the privilege under Section 8-803 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4.
39. At the federal level, the starting point is the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2006). For a detailed compilation of the fifty states' treatment of child abuse
reporting laws, see NAT'L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, MANDATORY REPORTING
OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: STATE STATUTES AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2010), available
at http://cakidscoalition.com/uploads/3/0/0/8/3008529/ndaa-mandatory-child-abuse-reporting.
10.14.11.pdf.
40. Cf. Abrams, supra note 25, at 1156-57 (predicting that constitutional violations involving
exemptions for clergy reporting would likely fall under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment). Abrams was concerned primarily with sexual misconduct towards children by
members of the clergy, and the ways in which reporting exemptions hinder the state's ability to
curb sexual misconduct by members of the clergy. This Comment construes the impact of clergy
involvement, or the lack thereof, more broadly than the prosecution of offending ministers.
[Vol. 62:187
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II. BACKGROUND: A RELIGIOUS, CONSTITUTIONAL,
AND LEGISLATIVE CANVAS
The Illinois carve-out for clergymembers in its mandatory reporting
laws is cast against a complex landscape of religious, constitutional,
and state legislative history. Any attempt to abolish the carve-out
must consider the ways in which each of these contexts affects the
problem.
A. The Clergy-Penitent Practice and Privilege
Private confession to, and seeking counsel from, members of the
clergy has long been a pillar of American religious practice. 41 Sharon
Hymer stated that "[v]irtually every religion stresses our need to
make reparation for wrongdoing to our neighbors as a way of showing
true remorse. '42 The Supreme Court has recognized this need to pro-
tect confessional communications. 43 Accordingly, there has been at
least some measure of formal protection for communications received
in the clergy-penitent context for nearly two centuries. 44 In the last
fifty years, the protection of clergy-penitent communications has be-
come more robust.45 For example, in 1972, the Supreme Court, by an
eight-to-one vote, approved changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence
that would have codified the privilege. 46 Rule 506, as framed by the
Court, stated that "[a] person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and
to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by
the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual
41. For a useful historical survey of the confessional and its legal status, see Mary Harter
Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege and
Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 734-40 (1987). See also Lori Lee Brocker,
Note, Sacred Secrets: A Call for the Expansive Application and Interpretation of the Clergy-Com-
municant Privilege, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 455, 455-59 (1991) (noting that over 40% of Ameri-
cans seek guidance from members of the clergy).
42. Sharon Hymer, Therapeutic and Redemptive Aspects of Religious Confession, 34 J. RELIG-
ION & HEALTH 41, 50 (1995).
43. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) ("[Sluits cannot be maintained which
would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional .... ").
44. The privilege was first recognized in People v. Phillips by a New York court in 1813. See I
W.L.J. 109, 112-13 (1843). In Phillips, the defendant, charged with trafficking stolen goods, had
confessed his crime to a priest to whom the defendant had also entrusted the stolen property for
return. Id. at 109. The court in Phillips held that the priest could not be compelled to testify
because the confession was received during the sacrament of penance. Id. at 112-13. To compel
the priest to testify would have violated the priest's freedom of religion. Id. at 113.
45. See Walter J. Walsh, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: An Hibernocentric Essay in Post Colo-
nial Jurisprudence, 80 IND. L.J. 1037, 1039 (2005) (noting that though religious freedoms had
been protected by the courts as early as Philips, it was not until after the second world war that
protection under the clergy-penitent privilege resumed its "antebellum dominance").
46. Mitchell, supra note 41, at 739.
2012]
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adviser."' 47 Although Congress never enacted the changes, the pro-
posals have since shaped the federal common law.48
B. The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech."' 49 Religion Clause jurisprudence considers both the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, which protects religious beliefs and practice, and the
Establishment Clause, which guards "the rights of religious and non-
religious citizens."'50 Clergy exemptions from mandatory reporting
laws, and abrogation of those exemptions, implicate both Clauses.51
1. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause is generally understood to protect relig-
ious belief absolutely, and religious practice or actions provisionally. 52
However, to the extent that the sincerity of belief informs and moti-
vates practice, belief and practice frequently overlap. 53 In Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court stated that as long as a law
47. 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1972) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972, effective July 1, 1973).
48. See Lennard K. Whittaker, The Priest-Penitent Privilege: Its Constitutionality and Doc-
trine, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 145, 148 (2000).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50. Shannon O'Malley, At All Costs: Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Statutes and the
Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 21 REV. LITIG. 701, 714 (2002).
51. See Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Relig-
ion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 810 (1978) (reasoning that the "single
unifying principle underlying the two religion Clauses ... is that individual choice in matters of
religion should remain free," and that, therefore, coercion makes laws unconstitutional with re-
spect to the Free Exercise Clause).
52. For the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as applied to beliefs,
see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (stating that the Free Exercise Clause is intended
to allow all people "to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties
they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments
in such form of worship as he may think proper"). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-04 (1940) ("Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society."); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
877 (1990) (declaring that the freedom to believe and profess whatever doctrine one desires is
"first and foremost" what the "free exercise" of religion means). For an example of the Supreme
Court's rationale concerning limitations on religious acts, beyond beliefs, see Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (reasoning that when an adherent moves beyond simple belief
into a "positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender
might escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought
never to have been made").
53. See Jane E. Mayes, Note, Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege Statutes:
Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern, 62 IND. L.J. 397, 414 (1987).
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was neutral and of general applicability, a burden imposed by the
state on religion did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 54 For two
decades, the standard articulated in Smith controlled Free Exercise
jurisprudence. In 2012, however, the Court modified its Smith Free
Exercise doctrine in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School v. EEOC.55 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that enforce-
ment of the Americans with Disabilities Act was unconstitutional be-
cause it "interfere[ed] with the internal governance" of a Lutheran
church. 56 Hosanna-Tabor muddied the waters concerning govern-
mental burdens because the definition of "internal governance" is not
entirely clear from the Court's opinion.57
Consideration of the clergy-penitent privilege under the First
Amendment is a novel twist on the typical Free Exercise Clause anal-
ysis. 58 Typically, a statute comes under scrutiny when it burdens the
free exercise of religion.59 But statutes that protect clergy-penitent
privilege actually serve "as an endorsement of the principle of relig-
ious freedom because [they promote] the free exercise of religion." 60
For this reason, it is the abrogation of the statute that must be consid-
ered in terms of its burden on the free exercise of religion. 61
2. The Establishment Clause
Similar to the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause ap-
plies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Whereas the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental interference in the
proper observance of religious belief and worship, the Establishment
Clause forbids both governmental advancement and inhibition of re-
ligion.63 The Establishment Clause protects both religious and non-
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 542 (1993).
55. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012).
56. Id. at 706.
57. See Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor,
the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 52-54 (Feb. 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/markstrasser/26.
58. See Mayes, supra note 53, at 413.
59. See id. at 412-13.
60. Id. at 413.
61. See id.
62. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (2004).
63. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Penn. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); see also
O'Malley, supra note 50, at 714 ("The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects
religious beliefs while the Establishment Clause protects the rights of religious and non-religious
citizens.").
2012]
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religious people. 64  In 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme
Court set forth a three-prong test to determine whether a statute is
constitutional under the Establishment Clause: first, the statute must
have a "secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and
third, the "statute must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. ' 65 Since 1971, the Court has advanced several it-
erations of the Lemon test in various contexts, yet no clear mandate
on its application has emerged.66 The Supreme Court itself stated that
the Lemon factors "are no more than helpful signposts. '67
C. The Backdrop of National Child Protection Legislation
The modern era of child protective services began in 1962.68
Though there had been a growing awareness of the problems of child
abuse and neglect prior to 1962, in that year, pediatrician Henry
Kempe and his colleagues published the seminal article, The Battered
Child Syndrome.69 On the heels of its publication, Congress, through
amendments to the Social Security Act, recognized Child Protective
Services as an essential element of child welfare. 70 In 1974, recogniz-
ing the crucial role of mandatory reporters in the prevention of child
abuse, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA). 71 Through CAPTA, the federal government, as parens
patriae, assumed broad powers in "protecting the interests of children
64. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and Government Speech, 97 IOWA L. REv. 347,
375-76 (2012). Corbin identified three purposes of the Establishment Clause: (1) to protect the
stability of society by deterring civil strife resulting from religious preferentialism; (2) to guard
established religion from the negative consequences of state intrusion; and (3) to protect those
who do not share the beliefs of religious adherents. Id.
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
66. See Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of Mandatory Reporting
Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith World, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 703,
716 (2004). This comment asserted that there are now, in addition to the three-prong test de-
scribed in Lemon, three other approaches. See id. at n.101; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 684-85 (1984); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
536 U.S. 639, 651 (2002). Each of these approaches, Pudelski observed, operates in a distinct
context. Pudelski, supra, at 716-17 n.102.
67. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Many of our recent cases simply have not applied
the Lemon test.").
68. John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 449, 455
(2008).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2006)).
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and in intervening when parents fail to provide proper care."'72 An
important provision of CAPTA made funding available to the states
for prevention and treatment programs aimed at child abuse and neg-
lect.73 To be eligible for such a grant, states had to implement pro-
grams related to child abuse and neglect that mandate "reporting by
individuals required to report such instances. '74
As a result of this provision, mandatory reporting laws grew robust
and spread among the states.75 Today, all fifty states have mandatory
reporting laws that specify the professions required to report child
abuse and neglect. CAPTA, as it has been amended since 1974, con-
tinues to have a significant impact and role in the protection of at-risk
children. 76
D. Child Protection in Illinois
With CAPTA in place, and in the wake of the national movement to
expand protective services for children, the Illinois legislature enacted
ANCRA. ANCRA identifies professions that are required to report
cases of child abuse or neglect. 77 Failure to report under the Illinois
statute constitutes a criminal offense with punishment ranging in se-
verity from a class A misdemeanor to a class 4 felony, and, if applica-
ble, may include a referral to a professional disciplinary board.78 In
1975, the list of required reporters under ANCRA consisted of
twenty-two designated professions. 79 Today, that list has expanded to
more than forty professions. 80  Statutory amendments from 1986 to
the present have enlisted an ever-wider range of professionals in the
effort to protect children from the harms of abuse.81
72. OFFICE ON CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT INCLUDING ADOPTION OPPORTUNITIES AND
THE ABANDONED INFANTS ASSISTANCE ACT AS AMENDED BY THE KEEPING CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES SAFE ACT OF 2003, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws-
policies/cblaws/captaO3/capta.manual.pdf.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (2006).
74. Id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2011).
75. See Pudelski, supra note 66, at 707 (explaining that child abuse laws have developed over
decades and continue to be discussed in Congress).
76. See Myers, supra note 68, at 457.
77. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010).
78. Id.
79. Act effective July 1, 1975, No. 79-65, 1975 I11. Laws 146 (codified as amended at 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010)).
80. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4.
81. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1986, No. 84-611, sec. 1, § 4. 1985 Ill. Laws 3958, 3960-61 (substi-
tuting "foster parent, homemaker or child care worker" for "child care or foster care worker");
Act effective July 1, 1986, No. 84-1078, sec. 1, § 4, 1985 Ill. Laws 7127, 7127-28 (adding resident,
intern, dentist hygienist, emergency medical technician, assistants working under the direct su-
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As a consequence of ANCRA, Illinois, like the rest of the country,
has seen a sharp increase in the number of interventions in situations
of child abuse and neglect. 82 Since the enactment of the statute, the
number of reports received by the Illinois Department of Child and
Family Services (DCFS) rose from about 37,000 in 1980, to over
100,000 in 2001.83 Mandated reporters play a central role in the child
protection scheme under ANCRA-approximately 65% of reports of
child abuse and neglect in Illinois are brought to light by state-man-
dated reporters. 84 DCFS summarized the value of these reporters as
follows:
DCFS is often limited in its ability to intervene in family life, both
by the law which defines its operations and by the resources availa-
ble. In making a report, mandated reporters are in the best position
to identify signs of harm to children and to take the steps necessary
to help protect them. 85
In 2002, ANCRA was amended to include members of the clergy as
"persons required to report. ' 86 However, the 2002 amendment, P.A.
92-801, was different from other amendments that expanded the man-
dated-reporter section. Although ANCRA had been amended multi-
ple times to expand the list of mandated reporters since its initial
enactment, only P.A. 92-801 created new paragraphs dedicated exclu-
sively to one profession: members of the clergy. The first paragraph
added by P.A. 92-801 required:
Any member of the clergy having reasonable cause to believe
that a child known to that member of the clergy in his or her profes-
pervision of a psychologist, and psychiatrist); Act effective Aug. 21, 1987, No. 85-205, sec. 1, § 4,
1987 I11. Laws 1283, 1285 (adding crisis line or hotline personnel, educational advocate assigned
to a child pursuant to the School Code, domestic violence program personnel, recreational pro-
gram or facility personnel, and rehabilitation services); Act effective July 1, 1990, No. 86-1004,
sec. 3, § 4, 1989 Ill. Laws 6837, 6838 (adding substance abuse treatment personnel); Act effective
Jan. 1, 1996, No. 89-363, sec. 15, § 4, 1995 Ill. Laws 3673, 3679 (adding funeral home director or
employee); Act effective Jan. 31, 1997, No. 89-706, sec. 275, § 4, 1996 Ill. Laws 3999, 4021-22
(adding acupuncturist); Act effective July 14, 1997, No. 90-116, sec. 20, § 4, 1997 I11. Laws 2352,
2362-63 (adding physician assistant); Act effective Aug. 13, 1999, No. 91-516, sec. 5, § 4, 1999 I11.
Laws 5821, 5821 (adding advance practice nurse and home health aid); Act effective Jan. 1, 2000,
No. 91-259, sec. 15, § 4, 1999 Il1. Laws 3211, 3218 (adding respiratory care practitioner); Act
effective Aug. 16, 2002, Pub. Act No. 92-801, sec. 5, § 4, 2002 Il. Laws 2737, 2939-40 (adding
members of the clergy); Act effective July 10, 2003, No. 93-137, sec. 5, § 4, 2003 Ill. Laws 1598,
1599 (adding licensed professional counselor and licensed clinical professional counselor); Act
effective Sept. 29, 2004, No. 93-1041, sec. 905, § 4, 2004 I11. Laws 4381, 4398 (adding genetic
counselor); Act effective Aug. 27, 2007, No. 95-461, sec. 5, § 4, 2007 I11. Laws 6668, 6668-69
(adding certain school board members).
82. See Myers, supra note 68, at 459.
83. MANUAL FOR MANDATED REPORTERS, supra note 23, at 2.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 3.
86. See Act effective Aug. 16, 2002, No. 92-801, sec. 5, § 4, 2002 II. Laws 2737, 2939-40.
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sional capacity may be an abused child as defined in item (c) of the
definition of "abused child" in Section 3 of this Act [325 ILCS 5/3]
shall immediately report or cause a report to be made to the
Department.87
Even more significantly, the second paragraph added by P.A. 92-
801 granted privileged status to communications made to members of
the clergy concerning the abuse and neglect of children: "A member
of the clergy may claim the privilege under Section 8-803 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 88 This paragraph is especially significant because
it immediately follows the section that states the general rule for man-
dated reporters: "The privileged quality of communication between
any professional person required to report and his patient or client
shall not apply to situations involving abused or neglected children
and shall not constitute grounds for failure to report as required by
this Act."'8 9 In other words, members of the clergy, unlike other pro-
fessions on ANCRA's list of mandated reporters, may claim privilege
as a justification for the failure to report.90 The juxtaposition of the
general rule for all mandated reporters against the exception for
clergymembers underscores the legislature's intent to preserve the
clergy-penitent privilege.91 In its present form, then, ANCRA lists
members of the clergy as mandated reporters, but exempts them from
the reporting requirements if a confession or admission is received "in
his or her professional character or as a spiritual advisor in the course
of the discipline enjoined. '92
E. People v. Campobello: ANCRA Applied
In People v. Campobello, the court considered the interpretation of
the phrases "in his or her professional character" and "a spiritual advi-
sor in the course of the discipline enjoined." 93 The case involved a
Roman Catholic priest who faced sexual assault charges after it was
87. Id. The Illinois construction of an additional paragraph for clergy is also unusual among
the states. Cf. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3 (2009).
88. Act effective Aug. 16, 2002, No. 92-801, sec. 5, § 4, 2002 Ill. Laws 2737, 2939-40.
89. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010) (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., People v. Morton, 543 N.E.2d 1366, 1373 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that com-
munications to a hospital counselor regarding aggravated sexual abuse of a child were not privi-
leged because ANCRA destroyed any confidentiality).
91. See Transcription Debate, supra.note 24.
92. See 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803. Illinois is one of only three
states in which it is the clergymember, not the penitent, who owns the privilege. Illinois is unu-
sual, therefore, in that any decision to disclose information falls upon the member of the clergy
and not the person who has shared privileged communications. See generally DURHAM &
SMITH, supra note 14.
93. See People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 320-21 (11. App. Ct. 2004).
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alleged that he molested a young girl in his trust.94 Per Diocese rules,
the matter was referred to a Diocesan misconduct officer, whose re-
sponsibility was to report findings to an intervention committee.95
The State subpoenaed various records generated by the misconduct
officer and the intervention committee.96 The misconduct officer
"averred that the records generated by [him] and the intervention
committee contain[ed] the 'religious thoughts and ideas of members
of the Church." 97 Accordingly, the Diocese moved to quash the sub-
poenas, arguing that the records were protected by the clergymember
privilege. 98 The trial court rejected the Diocese's argument.99 On ap-
peal, the Diocese argued that the trial court read the statute too nar-
rowly.100 Specifically, the Diocese argued that section 8-803 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure should have been construed to pro-
tect information shared by the defendant with a board of the Diocese
because Diocese members were members of the clergy.10 1
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 0 2 The
court adopted a narrow definition of the phrase "professional charac-
ter," in light of what it considered to be the crucial statutory qualifica-
tion: "in the course of discipline. '' 10 3 Because the term had not been
defined, the court surveyed interpretation of similar phrases in other
jurisdictions10 4 From its survey, the court determined that "the 'disci-
pline' referred to in section 8-803 is limited to the set of dictates bind-
ing a clergymember to receive from an individual an 'admission' or
'confession' for the purpose of spiritually counseling or consoling the
individual."10 5 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the clergy-peni-
tent privilege extends to communications made in confidence, in a
one-to-one setting, noting that "an admission or confession is not priv-
ileged if made to a clergymember in the presence of a third person
unless such person is 'indispensable' to the counseling or consoling
activity of the [clergymember]."10 6 With this definition of the privi-
lege in hand, the court remanded the case and ordered that the record
94. Id. at 311.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 312.
99. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 313.
100. Id. at 319.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 320.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d at 321.
106. Id.
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of the priest's meetings with the Diocese intervention board and mis-
conduct officer be produced for an in camera inspection to determine
whether the communications fell within the definition. 107
III. ANALYSIS: DEFECTS OF CLERGY EXEMPTIONS IN
MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS
Though the desire to respect the time-honored tradition of pastor-
penitent privilege is laudable, clergy exemptions from mandatory re-
porting laws generally suffer from two serious flaws. First, the exemp-
tions are usually ambiguous. Second, they face problems related to
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
A. Ambiguity of the Statute
The section of the Code of Civil Procedure that ANCRA refers to
in exempting members of the clergy from the requirement to report 0 8
is conditioned on the existence of confessions or admissions received
by "him or her in his or her professional character or as a spiritual
advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or prac-
tices of such religious body or of the religion which he or she pro-
fesses."10 9 The problem arises from the ambiguity of the phrases "in
his or her professional character" and "as a spiritual advisor in the
course of the discipline enjoined." 110 As notions of confession extend
beyond the walls of the Roman Catholic confessional, interpretations
of ANCRA and similar statutes create significant challenges of
interpretation."'I
1. Interpretation Challenges
Interpretation of reporting statutes varies widely among the
states."l2 In the Third Circuit, for example, the pastor-penitent privi-
lege exists when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the clergy-
man must be acting in his or her spiritual or professional capacity; (2)
107. Id. at 321-22.
108. See 325 ILL. COMP. STATr. 5/4 (2010)
109. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2010).
110. See Colombo, supra note 15, at 251 (claiming that misunderstanding regarding the "con-
tours of the clergy-penitent privilege under the Constitution" accounts for several problems with
the application of the privilege by (1) improperly extending protection over conversations that
should not be privileged; (2) constraining application to only a few specific denominations; and
(3) not providing concomitant protective legislation for members of the clergy who invoke the
privilege).
111. See Horner, supra note 12, at 706-12.
112. See Colombo, supra note 15, at 233-34 (observing among the states no less than three
distinct ways of defining the scope of covered communication).
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the penitent must be seeking spiritual counseling; and (3) the penitent
must be reasonably expecting that his or her words will be kept in
confidence. 113 In Louisiana, on the other hand, the statute does not
observe a distinction between a clergymember per se and a
clergymember acting in a professional capacity.114 Thus, regardless of
intent or expectations, communications are privileged if they are ex-
pressed to a member of the clergy.1 5 Illinois's statute has require-
ments similar to those set forth by the Third Circuit, but does not
include an expectation of confidence by the penitent.11 6
Such varied interpretations of clergy-penitent privilege have re-
sulted in diverse outcomes among the states. In State v. Martin, for
example, a Washington court held that the conversation in question
could be privileged, even though the defendant made his admission in
his mother's apartment, with his mother present for at least part of the
conversation.11 7 Similarly, in State v. J.G., a New Jersey court ruled
that the defendant's conversation with his pastor was protected, even
though their conversation took place in a public park. 18 On the other
hand, in State v. Mark R., a Connecticut court held that the defen-
dant's confession of the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter was not priv-
ileged, even though it took place in the pastor's office while the
defendant's wife and the victim were the only other people in the
building. 19 These diverse outcomes, like the holding in Campobello,
illustrate the challenges courts face in applying clergy-privilege
laws.1 20
Additionally, while the decisions seek to clarify ambiguous lan-
guage in the rules, these explanations often suffer from the same
problems of interpretation. 121 In the wake of Campobello, for exam-
113. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1990). Here, the court did not
apply Pennsylvania state law, but instead looked to Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and other
federal sources. Id.
114. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603 (2004).
115. Id. The definitions section of the statute defines a "Member of the Clergy" as one who is
"authorized or accustomed to hearing confidential communications, and under the discipline or
tenets of the church, denomination, or organization has a duty to keep such communications
confidential." Id. Under this definition, Louisiana's clergy-penitent privilege focuses on the
clergymember's authorization to hear privileged communications, not the manner in which com-
munications are received.
116. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2010).
117. State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152, 159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
118. State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1125, 1134 (N.J. 2010).
119. State v. Mark R., 17 A.3d 1, 8 (Conn. 2011).
120. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
121. Several authors have discussed the challenges of ambiguity in statutory construction of
the type present in Campobello. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consen-
sus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 59 (2010) ("[Plerceptions of ambiguity
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ple, several important questions remain. Specifically, what are the
boundaries that comprise "the purpose of spiritually counseling or
consoling the individual"? 122 When is a third person "'indispensible'
to the counseling or consoling activity of the clergymember"? 123 And
when is the clergymember functioning in a manner that is distinguish-
able from situations in which the clergymember is functioning as a
mom, husband, or friend?
To illustrate, consider the following tragic example that occurred a
few years ago within the presbytery in which this author served as a
pastor.'2 4 A girl, thirteen or fourteen years of age, was sexually
abused by her father over a period of time-at least a year in length.
The father, daughter, and the rest of their family were regular at-
tendees of a Presbyterian church, but not formal members.
One evening, the victim contacted the pastor's teenage son. The
two were friends from the church's youth group. She told the pastor's
son about her abuse, but expressly requested that he not share the
information with his father. The son, deeply troubled by what he
heard, told his father anyway. The pastor immediately called DCFS.
The agency investigated the case, found sufficient evidence of the al-
leged abuse, and filed a complaint. The girl's father was arrested, con-
victed, and served an eighteen-month sentence for aggravated sexual
assault.
How, under Campobello, are the pastor's restrictions and responsi-
bilities to be understood in such a situation? Because the girl insisted
that the teenage boy not tell his father-the pastor-should the teen-
age son be considered a third person "indispensable" to the counsel-
ing or consoling activity of the clergymember? If so, did the pastor
breach his duty of confidentiality by reporting the suspected abuse?
Was the pastor, in hearing of the offense from his son, acting "as a
spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined," or was he
simply being a dad?
Additional examples need not be so exotic. A minister bumps into
a parishioner at a grocery store. There are several other shoppers
nearby, possibly within earshot. The parishioner catches the minis-
are ultimately colored by matters extrinsic to the underlying source material alone ...."); Ward
Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2
J. LEGAL ANALYSiS 257, 281 (2010) ("[]ow a statute gets interpreted in the end, or who does
the interpreting, will often depend on whether it is found ambiguous at the outset.").
122. People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 321 (I1. App. Ct. 2004).
123. Id.
124. In Presbyterian polity, a presbytery is a regional group of local churches of the same
denomination. The presbytery provides support and ecclesiastic oversight for its member
churches.
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ter's arm and whispers, "I've been meaning to talk to you." A syna-
gogue member drives by and sees her Rabbi mowing his lawn. She
stops the car, walks over, and over the din of the mower, yells, "I
could really use your opinion about something." A church member,
between putts on a golf green, says to his priest, "Father, I gotta tell
you something." After prayers, a Muslim approaches the presiding
Imam as the crowd disperses. Leaning in, he asks, "Could I have
about five minutes?" In these hypotheticals, taken out of the pages of
ordinary clergy life, are clergymembers acting "in the course of the
discipline enjoined"? Arguably, they are.
The problem stems from the inseparability of the role of the
clergymember and the identity of the clergymembert 25 From the
point of view of the typical member of the clergy, nearly every conver-
sation may be perceived as occurring in the context of acting as spiri-
tual advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined.126 As some
commentators have suggested, the nature of ministry resists any voca-
tional/nonvocational distinctions.127 "Their claim to a special call im-
plies.., that their private lives and career are not separate but bound
together in a literal embodiment of some of the culture's highest val-
ues."'1 28 For this reason, some commentators have concluded that if
members of the clergy are "always acting in a professional capacity,
the question becomes whether the priest-penitent privilege or the af-
firmative duty to report should control." 129
125. See Michael Lane Morris & Priscilla White Blanton, The Influence of Work-Related Stres-
sors on Clergy Husbands and Their Wives, 43 FAM. REL. 189, 189 (1994) (noting that profes-
sional clergymembers operate "with ambiguous separations between their professional and
private lives," as they "attempt to juggle the expectations of self, family, congregation, denomi-
nation, and God").
126. See DEREK PRIME & ALISTAIR BEGG, ON BEING A PASTOR: UNDERSTANDING OUR
CALLING AND WORK 36 (rev. ed. 2004) ("Whatever else a shepherd and teacher provides for
God's people, he is to give them an example to follow.... What is more, the example we are to
provide is to be maintained all our life."); see also Brent Roam, Comment, Confessions of Faith:
A Reasonable Approach to Arizona's Clergy Privilege, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 775, 784 (2008) ("[T]he
precise legal delineation between a lay leader serving in a nondenominational church and a
'clergyman' for purposes of the privilege remains elusive.").
127. See Richard W. Christopherson, Calling and Career in Christian Ministry, 35 REV. RELIG-
IOUS RES. 219, 232-33 (1994). As an example, Christopherson quoted a senior minister who left
a large church after his divorce, specifically regarding his congregation's perceptions of him as
pastor: "The spotlight was on me, the shame I knew because I couldn't make this relationship
work.... My private life made me a worse minister, a flawed minister, and I longed to get away
from that." Id. at 232 (emphasis added); cf Jackson, supra note 11, at 1067 (analogizing clergy
professional character extending beyond occupational duties to that experienced by police of-
ficers in their line of work). But see People v. Campobello, 810 N.E.2d 307, 320 (I1. App. Ct.
2004) (rejecting the notion that a member of the clergy's professional character extends beyond
his or her capacity as a spiritual advisor).
128. Christopherson, supra note 127, at 233.
129. See Jackson, supra note 11.
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2. The Problems of Statutory Ambiguity and Child Abuse
In general, clergy-penitent communications often have value.13
0
After all, as the Supreme Court observed, the clergy-penitent privi-
lege addresses one of humankind's highest felt needs. 131 Moreover,
confidential access to members of the clergy may also promote mores
that society deems valuable. 132 One commentator is especially opti-
mistic in this regard:
When effective, such confession and counseling instills in penitents
a sense of responsibility, provides penitents with the encouragement
to abandon behavior that is condemned by church and state alike,
and in the process, imparts moral understanding that leaves
penitents better than they were before committing the acts that
caused them to seek clergy assistance in the first place. 133
Such benefits make the availability of the clergy-penitent communica-
tions desirable in most scenarios. For this reason, although the statu-
tory ambiguities discussed above may be perplexing, they should not
always be fatal to the protected status of clergy-penitent privileged
communications. 134
Considered against the glaring problem of child abuse, however, the
benefits of the clergy-penitent privilege fade.135 The heinous nature
of child abuse seriously undermines whatever benefits society receives
from protected disclosure. 136 In these volatile and often dangerous
settings, the privilege and its attendant ambiguities are intolerable.
137
Instead, ambiguities that concern the scope of the clergymember's
130. For a list of societal benefits resulting from continued application of the clergy-penitent
privilege, see Shawn P. Bailey, How Secrets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent Privi-
lege Through a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 506
(2002).
131. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
132. See Whittaker, supra note 48, at 161 (arguing that the clergy-penitent privilege advances
the state's interests by promoting the penitent's well-being and encouraging honesty).
133. Bailey, supra note 130.
134. Cf. R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person
Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1635 (2003) (noting
that forcing clergymembers to disclose privileged communications may bring harm by engender-
ing "public backlash and perhaps undermining public faith in government").
135. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 1071 ("With over 2.4 million cases of child abuse and
neglect reported in 1989 alone, it is easy to see that child abuse is a major problem in the United
States and that affirmative action [with respect to the abrogation of the privilege] needs to be
taken.").
136. Indeed, some commentators have argued that exempting members of the clergy from
reporting responsibility in cases of child abuse will actually erode trust in the church's ability to
provide beneficial guidance. See Julie M. Arnold, "Divine" Justice and the Lack of Secular Inter-
vention: Abrogating the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in Mandatory Reporting Statutes to Com-
bat Child Sexual Abuse, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 849, 896 (2008).
137. For a discussion of the peculiar vulnerability of children in abusive settings, see infra
notes 243-264 and accompanying text.
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duty impede reporting, which is essential to an endangered child's
well-being. 138 ANCRA's statutory defect in this regard is fatal. Be-
cause the clergymember's duty under ANCRA is ambiguous, a
clergymember is left with uncertain guidelines as to when conversa-
tions are privileged, and thus protected. In its consideration of P.A.
92-801, the Illinois legislature wrestled with this difficulty.139 One rep-
resentative framed it well:
Well, how do you separate a congregant that reports abuse in the
context of trying to get... trying to report it to somebody because a
crime has been committed? How do you separate that out from the
person that goes to their clergyperson to report that a different per-
son has committed this crime but they don't report it in the context
of a crime? They report it in the context of, maybe they think they
have sinned. Maybe they think they are going to report it in the
context of a confessional or some other meeting with their
clergyperson.140
Abrogating the clergy reporting exemption in cases of child abuse
would take the guesswork out of the process and provide agencies
with an important tool to secure the well-being of children in harm's
way.
Similar to other mandated professionals, the clergymember's duty
to report abuse should be absolute. States with similar exemptions for
clergy should also recognize the attendant problems of ambiguity.141
When a child's physical and emotional well-being are at stake,
mandatory reporters must not be given latitude in determining the
scope of their duty. Members of the clergy should always have a duty
to report.
Of course, imposing such an affirmative duty upon members of the
clergy will raise questions of constitutional import-specifically First
Amendment concerns.
B. Religion Clause Concerns
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether clergy-penitent privi-
leged communications are protected under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. 42 This Comment contends that, if the provisions
of ANCRA were challenged on constitutional grounds, the Supreme
Court should rule that (1) abrogation of the exemption would not vio-
138. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 959 P.2d 152, 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
139. See Transcription Debate, supra note 24, at 18-25.
140. Id. at 22 (statement of Rep. Lang).
141. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
142. See Cassidy, supra note 134, at 1661 (noting that the Supreme Court has mentioned the
privilege three times, but has yet to address it squarely).
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late the Free Exercise Clause and (2) a failure to abrogate the exemp-
tion would violate the Establishment Clause.
1. Abrogation of the Exemption Would Not Violate the Free
Exercise Clause
Recall that the exemption from mandatory reporting for members
of the clergy under ANCRA is limited to those situations in which a
clergymember receives a communication that is a "confession or ad-
mission made to him or her in his or her professional character or as a
spiritual advisor in the course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or
practices of such religious body or of the religion which he or she pro-
fesses. 1 43 Justification for the exemption, like the justification for all
expressions of clergy-penitent privilege, rests on the perception of
these communications as sacred and inviolate. 144 Any restriction of
the right to such sacred and inviolate communications potentially runs
afoul of the Free Exercise Clause because it burdens religious
activity. 145
a. The Smith Standard Applied
Statutory burdens on the exercise of religion are not unconstitu-
tional per se.146 Instead, the constitutionality of a statute that burdens
religion must undergo the analysis espoused in Employment Division
v. Smith.147 According to Smith, if a neutral and generally applicable
law only incidentally burdens religion, that law does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. 148 The proposed abrogation of the clergy ex-
emption would likely be constitutional under this standard.
To begin, the legislative context in which the abrogation would
likely occur demonstrates the neutrality of the law. Prior to the pas-
sage of P.A. 92-801, ANCRA specified forty-four professions as man-
dated reporters. These included twenty professions that appeared in
the original iteration of ANCRA.149 The twenty-five additional pro-
143. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2010).
144. See Michael J. Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L.
REV. 171, 192-93 (1998) (noting that clergymembers regard such communications as "protected
under the laws of their church and sacred in the sight of God").
145. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993)
(holding that the Free Exercise Clause was dispositive when Florida had disfavored petitioners'
religion through restriction of a religious practice).
146. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("Not all burdens on religion are
unconstitutional.").
147. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
148. See id. at 879.
149. The original occupations listed in ANCRA included the following: Any physician, hospi-
tal, surgeon, dentist, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, Christian Science practitioner, coroner,
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fessions added between 1975 and 2002 represented a broad cross-sec-
tion of occupations in which professionals might become aware of
child abuse.150 The addition of clergymembers to the list of mandated
reporters was an effort by the legislature to fortify the protective net
through which at-risk children might slip.151 The legislative history of
ANCRA shows that the exemption, as originally contemplated, was
added, not as an attempt to restrict religion, but instead as an attempt
to avoid a constitutional challenge to the statute. 152 Thus, abrogation
of the exemption would actually enhance the neutrality and general
applicability of ANCRA because it would put clergymembers on
equal footing with all other mandated reporters.
The remaining question is whether abrogating the exemption only
incidentally burdens religion. In Smith, respondents were members of
the Native American Church. 15 3 As part of their religious practice,
and for ceremonial purposes, respondents ingested peyote.1 54 How-
ever, at the time, Oregon Law forbade the use of the substance.1 55
Respondents, both employees at a drug rehabilitation center, were
fired. 156 When respondents subsequently applied for state unemploy-
ment benefits, their claim was denied, "because they had been dis-
charged for work-related 'misconduct."' 157 The Oregon Supreme
Court held that the purpose of Oregon's unemployment benefits mis-
conduct provision was "inadequate to justify the burden [that] dis-
qualification imposed on respondent's religious practice.1' 58
school teacher, school administrator, truant officer, social worker, social services administrator,
registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, director or staff assistant of a nursery school or a child
day care center, law enforcement officer, or field personnel of the Illinois Department of Public
Aid. Act effective July 1, 1975, No. 79-65, 1975 I11. Laws 146 (codified as amended at 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010)).
150. For a list of amendments to ANCRA that added occupations required to report, see
supra note 81.
151. See Transcription Debate, supra note 24, at 20 (statement of Rep. Mulligan). Represen-
tative Mulligan's comments on the floor of the House during the debate of P.A. 92-801 are
indicative in this regard:
I think [the bill] makes a clear-cut statement that clergy should be mandatory reporters.
And I think that that's been lacking .... And many other people are mandatory report-
ers now, teachers, social workers, doctors. I think that this is really an important issue,
particularly with the current climate of what's happening in this country.
Id.
152. Id. at 17. "This legislation keeps intact the clergy privilege protecting information re-
ceived in a spiritual confession which safeguards the legislation from any [c]onstitutional chal-
lenge." Id. (statement of the bill's sponsor, Rep. Lyons).
153. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 875.
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Accordingly, the court held that respondents were entitled to unem-
ployment benefits. 159 "
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 160 In holding that Ore-
gon's prohibition of peyote use was constitutional, the Court stated
that because respondents' dismissal was based on a violation of the
law, denial of unemployment benefits was proper. 161 The Court
looked to its earlier decisions and concluded that "free exercise does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law pros-
cribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pros-
cribes).'"162 The Court reasoned that because the law prohibiting
peyote was neutral and generally applicable, even if it had the inciden-
tal effect of burdening religion, the law did not violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 163 The Court in Smith compared the Oregon law that
forbade peyote use to such generally applicable laws as the collection
of a general tax, by which the burden imposed by a law is incidental to
its primary purpose-raising revenue.164
The clegy-penitent exemption is similar to the tax envisioned by the
Smith Court. The duty to report is currently shared by other profes-
sions in a position to become aware of abuse. To abrogate the exemp-
tion would merely impose similar duties on clergymembers as those
imposed on over forty other similarly positioned professions. In other
words, like the required compliance in Smith, abrogation would force
clergy compliance with a neutral and generally applicable law. Fur-
thermore, the primary purpose of the duty to report is the safeguard-
ing of children. Thus, the burden to religion would be merely
incidental. Proposed abrogation of the exemption would, therefore,
not likely suffer from Free Exercise Clause defects.
b. Hosanna-Tabor: Outward Physical Acts v. Internal Church
Decision
In 2012, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Court's
Free Exercise jurisprudence became more nuanced.1 65 The Court ex-
plained that a First Amendment ministerial exemption is an affirma-
159. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875.
160. Id. at 890.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
163. Id. at 878.
164. Id.
165. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710
(2012).
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tive defense to a claim of discrimination under federal employment
law.166 The Court considered an alleged violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA).167 Respondent taught as a "called
teacher" in a Lutheran parochial school. 168 She was diagnosed with
narcolepsy and began the 2004-2005 school year on disability leave. 169
In February of 2005, the church congregation had voted to offer Re-
spondent the opportunity to resign, but Respondent refused to do
So. 1 70 In April of 2005, the congregation voted to rescind Respon-
dent's call. 171 Respondent sued, alleging that she had been fired in
violation of the ADA.172
The Court held that there had been no violation of the ADA.1 73
The Court determined that the church was protected by the ministe-
rial exception clause within the ADA.174 The statute's exception, as
explained by the Court, "precludes application of such legislation to
claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers.' 75 Respondent argued that, based on the
Court's decision in Smith, the ministerial exception violated the Free
Exercise Clause because the exception violated a neutral law of gen-
eral applicability.' 76 The Supreme Court disagreed.1 77 The Court dis-
tinguished Smith on the grounds that the practices considered in Smith
were "outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, "concerns
government interference with an internal church decision that affects
the faith and mission of the church itself. 1 78 In doing so, the Court
recalled language from its decision in Smith, which stated that it would
regulate "physical acts," but not "lend its power to one or the other
side in controversies over religious authority or dogma."'179
166. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REv.
LITIG. 313, 350 (2012).
167. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699-700.
168. Id. at 699 (explaining that "called teachers" completed a "colloquy" program at a Lu-
theran college or university). "'Called' teachers are regarded as having been called to their
vocation by God through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a
teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 701.
173. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 705 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 706.
177. Id. at 707.
178. Id.
179. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (quoting Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Court's clarification of Smith in Hosanna-Tabor does not pre-
clude abrogation of the clergy exemption. Central to the Court's deci-
sion in Hosanna-Tabor was the degree to which the church's
employment decisions pertained to "the internal governance of the
church." 180 The Court was concerned that the respondent's suit would
"depriv[e] the church of control over the selection of those who will
personify its beliefs.' 81 Such matters are primarily ecclesiastical. 8 2
On the other hand, penitents' verbal confessions of sin to
clergymembers are individual and personal. They are analogous to
peyote use in Smith and distinct from matters concerning internal gov-
ernance of the church. In Smith, peyote use was an external physical
act conforming to the religious tenets of the Native American
Church. 83 Confession of sin to a priest or pastor is similarly an exter-
nal physical act conforming to the religious tenets of many faiths.184 It
is true that there is an internal component to confession for adherents,
but the internal characteristics of confession are unlike the internal
elements involved in governing an ecclesiastical body. For confession
of sin, the internal characteristics are individual and personal, similar
to the way peyote use was sacramental in Smith. Both personal con-
fession of sin and peyote use are, to adherents, expressions of religious
devotion and, arguably, forms of worship.18 5 The confession of sin,
therefore, is distinguishable from the internal church governance con-
sidered in Hosanna-Tabor.'18 6
The question of the clergy exemption does not pertain to a group's
self-governance, or questions of federal employment law. Rather, at
issue are personal expressions of devotion and worship. For these rea-
sons, Hosanna-Tabor is inapposite. Therefore, abrogation of the ex-
emption, after Hosanna-Tabor, would not tread on the Free Exercise
Clause.
180. Id. at 706 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. I am using "ecclesiastical" in its narrow, formal sense, which denotes concern with formal
church structures, leadership, discipline, and governance.
183. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
184. See State v. J.G., 990 A.2d 1122, 1127 (N.J. 2010).
185. See, e.g., Corporate Confession of Sin, REFORMATION THEOLOGY, http://www.reforma
tiontheology.com2006/05/corporate-confession of-sin.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
186. Many religious groups draw the same sharp line proscribing government intervention in
ecclesiastical matters. See, e.g., The Westminster Confession of Faith, CENTER FOR REFORMED
THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS, Ch. XXIII, § III, available at http://www.reformed.org/docu
ments/shaw/index.html?mainframe=/documents/shawshaw_23.html ("The civil magistrate may
not assume to himself the administration of the Word and sacraments, or the power of the keys
of the kingdom of heaven .... ").
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c. Hybrid and Individualized Governmental Assessment
Alternatives
Some authors who support the clergy exemption from mandatory
reporting laws contend that two alternative grounds justify the contin-
ued protection of the clergy-penitent privilege. 187 The first involves
hybrid claims-those alleging a violation of another constitutional
right in addition to a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.188 The
second involves what the Smith Court called "individualized govern-
mental assessment," which the Court used to distinguish the respon-
dent's claims from those in unemployment compensation cases like
Sherbert v. Verner. 89 Neither of these alternatives, however, is suffi-
cient to establish that an abrogation of the clergy exemption violates
the Free Exercise Clause.
In Smith, the Court distinguished petitioner's complaint from ear-
lier hybrid cases in which the Court had held that state statutes vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with another
constitutionally protected right.1 90 In such hybrid cases, the Court
would engage in a form of heightened scrutiny under which the state
would be required to show a compelling governmental interest.19'
Some commentators contend that requiring clergymembers to re-
port child abuse would create a hybrid claim involving the restriction
of religious rights as well as an intrusion upon free speech rights.' 92
Such writers argue that, at a minimum, compelled disclosure of privi-
leged conversations violates the clergymember's "autonomous im-
age. ' 193 In other words, the clergymember who is compelled to
disclose confidential communications must publicly disavow his most
dearly held religious beliefs. 194 As a result, these authors continue,
the clergymember is subjected to public humiliation and disgrace. 195
187. See Pudelski, supra note 66, at 720-30 (contending that the clergy exemption should
properly be construed as a Smith hybrid claim involving free speech concerns); see also Mazza,
supra note 144, at 196 (contending that a particularized government assessment of individual
Free Exercise claims under the privilege is appropriate).
188. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated ac-
tion have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunc-
tion with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press ... .
189. Id. at 884 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
190. See id. at 895-96.
191. Id. at 902.
192. See Pudelski, supra note 66, at 729 (arguing that mandated reporting by clergymembers is
compelled speech in violation of the Free Speech Clause, which "is exactly the type of additional
right, in addition to free exercise, that the Smith Court had in mind").
193. Id. at 728.
194. Id. at 728-29.
195. Id.
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This argument recognizes the previously discussed integration of
clergymembers' public and private personae. 196 However, such a hy-
brid claim is unlikely to prevail. Since the Supreme Court established
the hybrid-rights doctrine in 1990, the Court has not used the doctrine
to hold that a state law violates the Free Exercise Clause. 197 As one
commentator noted, "Academics have also expressed great skepticism
of the hybrid rights theory, with most scholars believing that the hy-
brid rights argument 'was a make-weight . . . that lacks enduring
significance.' "t98
Moreover, the federal appellate courts have struggled to consist-
ently apply the Smith hybrid-claims doctrine. 99 Some circuits have
disregarded it altogether, treating it as dicta.200 It has been called
"completely illogical" 20 1 and "seemingly impenetrable, '20 2 and the Su-
preme Court has asked whether it "has proven to be intolerable sim-
ply in defying practical workability. '20 3 In any event, the foregoing
comments raise doubts about whether a hybrid claim can establish a
Free Exercise Clause violation when clergymembers are required to
report conversations in the clergy-penitent context.
The Smith Court distinguished Sherbert, which required a statute
that substantially burdened religious practice to be justified by a com-
pelling government interest.20 4 Sherbert was an unemployment com-
pensation eligibility case.205 The appellant in Sherbert stated a claim
for unemployment benefits that the state denied based on the appel-
lant's refusal to work on Saturday for religious reasons.206 The Court
held that the state's disqualification of the appellant for unemploy-
ment benefits burdened the appellant's free exercise of religion. 20 7
The Court then considered whether a compelling state interest existed
for the government's disqualification and held that there was no com-
196. Cf supra Part III.A.
197. See Gage Raley, Note, Yoder Revisited: Why the Landmark Amish Schooling Case
Could-And Should-Be Overturned, 97 VA. L. REV. 681, 717-19 (2011) (noting that Justice
Souter has overtly criticized the doctrine, and suggesting that even Justice Scalia, the author of
the hybrid rights distinction, may have begun to disavow it).
198. Id. at 715.
199. See id. at 717-18.
200. Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 284 n.24 (3d Cir. 2009).
201. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
202. Hicks ex rel. Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661 (E.D.N.C.
1999).
203. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
204. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
205. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
206. Id. at 407.
207. Id. at 410.
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pelling state interest.20 8 The Smith Court observed that the nuances
of unemployment compensation law were such that an individual gov-
ernmental assessment was required to determine whether the case
qualified under the Sherbert rule.20 9 Such an assessment was not re-
quired outside the employment sphere for neutral laws of general ap-
plicability. 210  Some commentators have argued that requiring
clergymembers to report confidential conversations with penitents
should similarly require an individual governmental assessment.211
The theory is that various religious orders display a wide array of doc-
trines regarding penitence and confession. Just as unemployment
compensation eligibility rules require individualized assessments to
determine their constitutionality, courts should have to "consider
whether a particular cleric of a particular denomination must reveal
the contents of an allegedly confidential communication from a partic-
ular penitent. '212
However, in the case of typical mandatory reporting laws, the Smith
decision is fatal to the possibility of individualized governmental as-
sessments. Unlike the unemployment compensation eligibility law in
Sherbert, mandatory reporting laws carry criminal penalties for failure
to comply. For example, in Illinois, ANCRA specifies that failure to
comply with the statute is a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense
and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent violation. 213 The
Smith Court reasoned that individualized governmental assessments
are inapplicable to general criminal prohibitions of a particular form
of conduct. 214 Abrogating the clergy exemption creates an across-the-
board criminal prohibition against a failure to report known and sus-
pected instances of child abuse. Accordingly, an individualized gov-
ernmental assessment under Smith of the abrogation would be
inappropriate.
208. Id. at 407.
209. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("[A] distinctive feature of unemployment compensation pro-
grams is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind
an applicant's unemployment.").
210. Id. at 883.
211. See, e.g., Mazza, supra note 144, at 196.
212. Id.
213. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2010). In Illinois, a Class A misdemeanor is punishable by
imprisonment for a period of up to one year, and a fine not to exceed $2,500. 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-4.5-55. A Class 4 felony is punishable by imprisonment from between one and three
years, and a fine not to exceed $25,000. Id. §§ -45, -50.
214. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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d. Conclusion: No Free Exercise Clause Violation
As discussed above, abrogating the clergy exemption would result
in a neutral statute of general applicability. Indeed, because abroga-
tion would result in a statute that obligates members of the clergy
similar to other professionals, the resulting law would be more neutral
and more generally applicable. Attempts to justify the exemption do
not find purchase because hybrid claims are of dubious constitutional-
ity and individualized governmental assessments cannot apply to
across-the-board criminal prohibitions. Accordingly, abrogating the
clergy exemption to mandatory reporting laws does not raise Free Ex-
ercise Clause problems.
2. Failure to Abrogate the Exemption is a Violation of the
Establishment Clause
American history has been filled with debates regarding religious
exemptions since the Colonial days.2 15 Proponents of exemptions
view them as an essential part of religious liberty.216 The Establish-
ment Clause governs whether such exemptions are permitted. 17
a. Analysis Under Lemon
Evaluating exemptions under the Establishment Clause is not a
straightforward process. The line separating church and state, "far
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier de-
pending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship. ' '2 8 Nev-
ertheless, Lemon v. Kurtzman does provide some guidance. Under
Lemon, for a statute to survive scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause, it "must have a secular legislative purpose,. . . its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
[and] the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion." 219
215. See Douglas Laycock, The Religious Exemption Debate, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION
139, 140 (2009).
216. Id. at 176 ("The right to believe a religion is hollow without the right to practice the
religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution for exercising their religion.").
217. Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Stat-
utory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 133, 138 (2011).
218. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
219. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
2012]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
i. Abrogation under the purpose prong
With regard to the purpose prong, the Court's discussion in Mc-
Creary County v. ACLU of Kentucky is instructive.220 In McCreary,
the Court held that a display of the Ten Commandments in a Ken-
tucky courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. 221 The Court
considered the circumstances and context surrounding the display
through the eyes of an objective observer. 222 Two prior attempts to
display the Ten Commandments in the McCreary County courthouse
had been deemed to violate the Establishment Clause.223 After re-
viewing the decisions concerning the first two displays, the Court con-
cluded that McCreary County's justifications were insufficient under
the Establishment Clause because they were "presented only as a liti-
gating position. '224 The Court reasoned that an objective observer
probably would have concluded that petitioners had included the sec-
ular documents merely as a tactic to "keep a religious document on
the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious
neutrality." 225
A position taken solely for the purposes of litigation-a "litigating
position" like that criticized in McCreary-appears to have motivated
the passage of clergy exemptions for mandatory reporting. In consid-
eration of P.A. 92-801, the Illinois legislature sought the input of vari-
ous religious groups. 226 The resulting amendment favored religious
professionals-and penitents-unlike any other mandated profession.
The legislative history shows that the Illinois House of Representa-
tives was concerned that a bill requiring clergymembers to report
220. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005).
221. Id. at 850, 858.
222. Id. at 862. The Court noted that "reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and
our precedents sensibly forbid an observer 'to turn a blind eye to the context in which [the]
policy arose."' Id. at 866 (alterations in original) (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 315 (2000)).
223. Id. at 854-55.
224. Id. at 871. According to the lower court, the government's stated purposes were
(1) [T]o erect a display containing the Ten Commandments that is constitutional; (2) to
demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American
Law and Government; (3) [to include the Ten Commandments] as part of the display
for their significance in providing the moral background of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the foundation of our legal tradition.
ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 145 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. at 873.
226. During introductory comments at the outset of the debate of P.A. 92-801, Representative
Lyons explained, "This Bill is a result of a myriad of religious organizations at the table .... The
Catholic Conference, the Agudath Israel of America, Episcopal, Presbyterian, African Method-
ist, American Baptist, and so on." Transcription, supra note 24.
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would face a constitutional challenge.227 This makes sense because
requiring clergymembers to report against their religious commit-
ments would likely raise eyebrows in a court's Free Exercise Clause
analysis.
The exemption, according to the legislative history of P.A. 92-801,
was a calculated method to avoid constitutional problems. Yet ac-
cording to McCreary, litigating positions taken to avoid constitutional
problems would be insufficient to establish the constitutionality of a
statute.228 Were an objective observer to consider P.A. 92-801 in light
of its legislative context-the involvement of religious groups in the
legislative process and the unique exemption for religious profession-
als and penitents-,the objective observer would be hard-pressed to
find a secular legislative purpose. Rather, religious interests moti-
vated the exemption in P.A. 92-801. Like the attempt in McCreary,
the exemption for clergy in P.A. 92-801 was merely a litigating posi-
tion included to avoid constitutional problems. Just as the litigating
position in McCreary failed to cure a lack of secular purpose for the
display, the Illinois legislature's attempts to avoid constitutional
problems do not cure P.A. 92-801's lack of secular purpose. The stat-
ute is overtly religious in purpose, and thus in violation of the purpose
prong of the Establishment Clause.
ii. Abrogation under the effects prong
Even if the exemption for clergymembers satisfies the purpose
prong of Lemon, the exemption does not survive the effects prong.
Under Lemon, a statute's principal or primary effect must neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion. 229 In Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court
applied the Lemon effects prong and held that New York City's Title I
programs did not improperly advance religion.230 At issue was a pro-
gram in which federal funds supported the provision of remedial edu-
cation by public school teachers in parochial school classrooms. 231
The Court reasoned that simply because a federally funded teacher
entered a parochial school, she would not necessarily jettison her as-
signed duties and embark on religious indoctrination that would ad-
227. See id.
228. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 871.
229. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). For a good discussion of why
Lemon, as modified by Agostini, provides reliable guidance through the effects prong, see Mar-
cia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment
Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REv. 1171, 1203 (2006).
230. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997).
231. Id. at 211.
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vance religion.232 There was no risk of governmental inculcation of
religion. 233 In Mitchell v. Helms, the Supreme Court reflected on
Agostini and noted therein a neutrality principle operating to deter-
mine whether government aid improperly advances religion. 234
ANCRA recognizes that a variety of privileged communications
may exist, but the statute removes protection of such communications
in cases of child abuse. For example, a doctor who ordinarily is bound
to keep his patients' confidences is required to report child abuse. But
P.A. 92-801 grants clergymembers relief from the burden to report
imposed on other professionals. The sole basis of this exemption is
religious-the religious status of the professional and the religious
context in which the information was received. In this regard, unlike
the federal aid programs in Agostini, which gave financial relief indis-
criminately, the relief provided to clergymembers in P.A. 92-801 is
given exclusively with reference to religion. Under Lemon and Agos-
tini, a statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.235 But the primary effect of P.A. 92-
801 is to relieve religious leaders of a civil burden broadly imposed on
other professions. Religious groups thereby enjoy advantages un-
available to nonreligious professions. In this way, the principal or pri-
mary effect P.A. 92-801 advances religion. Accordingly, the
exemption violates the Establishment Clause.
In summary, abrogation of the clergy exemption does not raise Free
Exercise Clause problems. Instead, the exemption is itself a violation
of the Establishment Clause. After discussing the exemption's consti-
tutional defects, the gains a society receives by abrogating the exemp-
tion must be considered.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF ABROGATING THE PRIVILEGE
IN CASES OF CHILD ABUSE
A. The Clergymember's Opportunity to Help Those at Risk
Over 80% of Americans consider themselves religious. 236 Of these,
roughly 54% claim to attend religious ceremonies at least once or
twice a month.237 Forty percent of Americans who seek counseling
232. Id. at 226.
233. Id.
234. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000).
235. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
236. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. RELIG-
IOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-reli
gious-landscape-study-full.pdf.
237. Id. at 154.
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have sought guidance from a member of the clergy.238 As one com-
mentator explained, people "often trust the very fabric of their lives to
the counseling skills of their minister. Frequently the pastor is the
only person they allow to enter their private hells. In their desperate
need, they open their hearts to the pastor, whether or not he or she
deserves that trust. '239 The expansive religious landscape of America,
and the tradition of trust enjoyed by religious professionals, combine
to put clergymembers at the vanguard of child protection. Today's
ministers, rabbis, pastors, Imams, and priests are well positioned to
receive news of children who are at risk and take steps to begin the
process of intervention.
Of course, any contention advocating such disclosures by
clergymembers would be sharply criticized. After all, would not a
penitent consider public disclosure of "confessed sins" to be the pin-
nacle of betrayal? If, as some writers claim, clergymembers are the
only professionals to whom certain troubled and burdened people will
go for help, does not disclosure of the privileged communications
harm the very ones who are willing to expose their own weaknesses
and vulnerability? 240 Is this not why Free Exercise Clause concerns
are raised in the first place, out of concern for the rights of the peni-
tent confessor?
To be sure, the rights of the penitent are important. But in the face
of child abuse, the rights of the at-risk child outweigh penitent rights.
While the notion of disclosing confidences is disturbing, even more
disturbing are the devastating effects experienced by victims of child
abuse.241 Children, because of their peculiar vulnerability, require
special protection. Moreover, not only does child abuse most often
occur at the hands of parents, but children who have been abused are
also likely to be abused again.242 Though clergymembers may loathe
violation of what they consider to be sacred trust, these factors, which
are peculiar to children and the injuries they suffer, make non-report-
ing of known child abuse far more loathsome.
238. Brocker, supra note 41, at 455.
239. HOWARD CLINEBELL, BASIC TYPES OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING: RESOURCES
FOR THE MINISTRY OF HEALING AND GROWTH 47 (rev. ed. 1984).
240. Cf id. at 47-48.
241. See James C. Backstrom, Sexual and Physical Abuse of Children, 45 PROSECUTOR 19, 20
(2011) ("Abused and neglected children often suffer physical and emotional damage that result
in developmental delays, chronic health problems, learning disorders, depression, conduct disor-
ders, [and] post-traumatic stress disorder ... ."). Backstrom noted that inmates at correctional
facilities were almost three times as likely to have suffered abuse as children than those not in
incarceration. See id. at 22.
242. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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B. Children's Safety Trumps Religious Rights
The Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is evident beyond the need
for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor is compelling. ' 243 Specifically, the
Court recognized that the "peculiar vulnerability" of children may
curtail otherwise protected rights of adults.244 In Bellotti v. Baird, the
Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that required mi-
nors to receive parental consent before getting an abortion. 245 The
Court noted that its "concern for the vulnerability of children [had
been] demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors' claims to
constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property in-
terests by the State. '246 In particular, the Court identified several
challenges related to a minor's pregnancy that undermined a mandate
for parental consent: the narrow window in which abortion is an avail-
able option; the minor's "probable education, employment skills,
financial resources, and emotional maturity"; and the legal responsi-
bility of parenthood vis-A-vis the "legal disabilities" of the minor.247
The Court reasoned that, given these factors, "there are few situations
in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will
have consequences so grave and indelible. 2 48 The Court therefore
held that if a state required a pregnant minor to receive parental per-
mission before getting an abortion, the state must also provide an al-
ternative authorization procedure. 249  Importantly, the Court
described the impact of family dynamics with regard to teen
pregnancies:
[M]any parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and
young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particu-
larly vulnerable to their parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion
and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to as-
sume that the mere existence of a legal right to seek relief in supe-
rior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those
who need it the most.250
While the Court stated that, ideally, parents would be involved in a
minor's decision regarding an abortion, 251 it argued that the facts of
243. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
756-58 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
245. See id. at 651.
246. Id. at 634.
247. Id. at 642.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 643.
250. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643.
251. See id. at 640.
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Bellotti warranted flexibility with respect to the needs of children. 252
A minor's pregnancy creates urgencies that justify a suspension of the
"ideal" in the interests of the child. 253
Because of its attention to the peculiar vulnerability of children,
Belotti provides a template through which society should understand
the rights of child abuse victims. Just as time is of the essence for
minors considering an abortion, victims of child abuse also have a
pressing need for rapid intervention. 254 Prompt reporting also initi-
ates medical assistance by both pediatricians and qualified mental
health care professionals to assess future needs. 25 5 Intervention must
be provided promptly because the level of a victim's stress is directly
proportional to the length of time the victim is subjected to the
trauma-causing event.256
In addition, because of a child's innate vulnerability, abuse is rarely
an isolated event.257 Recidivistic tendencies of perpetrators under-
score the dangers to children.258 A study by the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services reported that children who
have been abused are 96% more likely to be abused again.259 An-
There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by
encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in
making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave
decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to
make it without mature advice and emotional support.
Id. at 640-41 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91 (1976)
(Stewart, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. See id. at 634.
253. Id. at 642 ("In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make
an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.").
254. See Albert R. Roberts, Bridging the Past and Present to the Future of Crisis Intervention
and Crisis Management, in CRISIS INTERVENTION HANDBOOK: ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND
RESEARCH 3, 13 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 3d ed. 2005) ("Caplan states that 'a relatively minor
force, acting for a relatively short time, can switch the balance to one side or another, to the side
of mental health or the side of mental ill health."' (citations omitted)); see also Lisa Coles, Pre-
vention of Physical Child Abuse: Concept, Evidence and Practice, COMMUNITY PRACTITIONER,
June 2008, at 18, 20 ("[Tlhe best protection for a child is achieved by the timely intervention of
family support services.").
255. See Nancy Kellogg, The Evaluation of Sexual Abuse in Children, 116 PEDIATRICS 506, 510
(2005).
256. See Albert R. Roberts, Assessment, Crisis Intervention, and Trauma Treatment: The In-
tegrative ACT Intervention Model, BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTION, Spring 2002, at
1, 3-4 (relating the need for intervention to a "subjective time clock," in which the greater length
of exposure a victim is exposed to a traumatic sensory experience, the greater the stress from
that exposure); see also Roberts, supra note 254, at 26 (calling for intervention to be as close to
the precipitating event as possible).
257. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
23 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (No. 01-1757).
258. Id.
259. See Chihak, supra note 17, at S211.
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other study that tracked recidivism among 197 convicted child molest-
ers found that 42% of offenders were convicted of a subsequent
violent or sexual crime.260 Thus, prompt intervention, which removes
the child from danger and initiates therapeutic treatment, is required
to secure the child's safety.
Furthermore, just as in Belotti, in which family dynamics could im-
pede a child's access to abortion services, in cases of child abuse, fam-
ily dynamics, specifically a parent's self-interest, may impede a child's
access to protective and healing services. 261 The Belotti Court recog-
nized that although not every parent would seek his or her interests
above the child's, the particular vulnerability of children warranted
the Court's action to secure a minor's right to an abortion without
having to provide judicial notice to a parent.2 62 Indeed, because par-
ents are most often the perpetrators of child abuse, the interests of
abused children in intervention will most often be diametrically op-
posed to the interests of parents.263 In such situations, it is perhaps
more likely that a parent will act in his own interests, at the expense of
the child. In that scenario, the vulnerable child is generally powerless
to secure his own rights. 264
For these reasons, just as the Belotti Court constrained parents'
rights to restrict a minor's access to abortion services, in cases of child
abuse, the clergymember's or penitent's right to interpret whether a
conversation is privileged, and therefore not subject to reporting,
should be similarly constrained. In fact, the case for court interven-
tion in instances of child abuse is perhaps even stronger than the situa-
tion contemplated in Belotti because child abuse has no viable place in
our society.
260. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 257, at 24.
261. See Chihak, supra note 17, at S211 ("The American Academy of Pediatrics (2007) reports
that children are often abused by someone they know."); see also Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing
Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Intervention, 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 539, 555 (1985) (describing cases in which parents decline services or
refuse to cooperate such that a social worker must assess whether or not the danger to a child
warrants the imposition of treatment).
262. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979).
263. Cf. William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel Lines Converge: The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L.
REV. 473, 475 (1990) (discussing the competing interests of children and parents in the context of
the Fifth Amendment in child abuse proceedings).
264. See David Finkelhor & Jennifer Dziuba-Leatherman, Victimization of Children, 49 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 173, 176-77 (1994) (providing several reasons for the particular vulnerability of
children: (1) children are weaker and possess small physical stature; (2) children cannot retaliate
or deter victimization; (3) children have little choice over with whom they will associate; (4)
children cannot leave high-risk relationships at will; and (5) children cannot dissociate from dan-
gerous people or environments).
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In sum, there are important advantages to requiring clergymembers
to report child abuse as an absolute duty. By eliminating the clergy
exemption, agencies like the DCFS of Illinois would garner an impor-
tant ally in the war against child abuse-the clergy. In addition, the
rights of vulnerable children would be better protected. Intervention
and treatment of abused children would likely be swifter. Abrogation
of the exemption, therefore, is desirable. In Illinois, and states that
have enacted laws similar to ANCRA, clergymembers should be in-
cluded on the list of mandated reporters without caveat.
V. PROPOSAL: "ANY PERSON" MANDATORY REPORTING
Seven states currently mandate the reporting of child abuse by "any
person" who becomes aware of it and expressly abrogate privilege in
cases of child abuse.2 65 This Comment proposes that the other forty-
three state legislatures adopt similar reporting statutes. Under this
proposal, the mandatory reporting requirements of ANCRA, and
other similarly constructed statutes, would be amended to abrogate
privilege in all cases involving clergymembers and include a similar
"any person" provision.
A. Benefits of an "Any Person" Reporting Mandate
Statutes that mandate a general duty for "any person" to report
child abuse confer significant societal benefits. Child abuse exacts
enormous costs on communities. 266 Accordingly, community mem-
bers have a vested interest in addressing the problem.267 A shared
duty to report abuse reflects that interest. As many commentators
have pointed out, community norms may either positively or nega-
tively affect the prevalence of child abuse.268 From a practical stand-
265. These states are Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see, and Texas. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
266. See Backstrom, supra note 241, at 22 (noting that in addition to the emotional damage
suffered by victims and families, communities nationwide spend an estimated $103.8 billion an-
nually as a result of child maltreatment).
267. Community involvement must include supportive elements that contribute to a positive
environment for families, as well as corrective involvement that addresses emerging crises. See
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Community Dimension of State Child Protection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
23, 35 (2005) (explaining that theorists understand communities to be an important part of ser-
vices to families, but have not yet grappled with the manner in which state agencies impact
community involvement).
268. See, e.g., Deborah Daro & Kenneth A. Dodge, Creating Community Responsibility for
Child Protection: Possibilities and Challenges, FUTURE CHILDREN, Fall 2009, at 67, 69 (explaining
at least four reasons why community matters: (1) community norms shape how parents under-
stand appropriate interactions with children; (2) community contexts can either support parents
or reinforce feelings of isolation; (3) communities can bring temporary relief to parents; and (4)
communities can provide professional services to improve the mental welfare of parents).
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point, the "any person" approach puts the problem in the hands of
community members and eliminates the "it's not my problem" justifi-
cation for passivity. Mandating affirmative duties makes the issue of
child abuse everyone's problem. Furthermore, a change to the law,
accompanied by a campaign to raise awareness, would draw the prob-
lem out of the shadows and into the light of day. A community with
that awareness and shared duty is an important weapon in the fight to
protect children.
This is not to say that shared-duty statutes are the magic bullet that
will effectively wipe out child abuse and neglect. Compliance with the
laws may be inconsistent because the duty to report will inevitably
compete with feelings of loyalty to those accused, especially when the
accused is a family member.269 Religious conviction may, like family
loyalty, hinder a clergymember's willingness to report. In 2002, for
example, one commentator observed that in Texas, which has an "any
person" statute, there had not been a single conviction for a refusal to
report since the privilege for clergymembers was abrogated for cases
of child abuse in 1985.270
Commentators have offered various solutions to the problem.
Some have suggested that judiciaries adopt affirmative common law
duties to protect, which would include more severe criminal penalties
for mandated reporters who fail to report when children are in-
jured.2 71 Other commentators have suggested that the possibility of
victims' recovery of tort damages from mandated reporters who fail to
report might sufficiently incentivize reporting. 272 According to this
269. See Backstrom, supra note 241, at 19 (stating that 86% of abuse occurs at the hands of
either a..parent or family member); id. at 20 (noting that the real incidence of abuse may be three
times as great as the rate of reporting, and that in one state only an estimated 20% of actual
abuse is reported).
270. See O'Malley, supra note 50, at 718.
271. See, e.g., Kristen Ditta, Comment, Who Will Protect Me Now? An In-Depth Look at the
Laws Protecting Children in Texas, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 285, 312 (2008). But see Jessica R.
Givelber, Note, Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to By-
stander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169, 3171 (1999) (arguing that the ineffectiveness of
"Good Samaritan" laws, which impose affirmative duties of "easy rescue," is evidence that "any
person" reporting mandates, like the Sherrice Iverson Act, would be similarly ineffective).
272. Marc A. Franklin & Matthew Ploeger, Of Rescue and Report: Should Tort Law Impose a
Duty to Help Endangered Persons or Abused Children?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 1021-22
(2000) (noting a New Jersey Supreme Court decision that held that "when a spouse has actual
knowledge or special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in sexually
abusive behavior against a particular person or persons," that spouse had a duty of care to warn
potential victims, and a failure to do so could constitute proximate cause of any resulting injury);
see also Jenna Miller, Note, The Constitutionality of and Need for Retroactive Civil Legislation
Relating to Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 599, 600 (2011) (advocating for the
enactment of laws that would allow civil suits against sexual abuse perpetrators even when the
statute of limitations has expired on potential criminal charges).
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theory, liability for damages due to negligence might actually provide
a greater incentive to report than the threat of criminal prosecution.
273
Evaluation of such alternatives is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, each alternative presumes the kind of "any person" man-
date envisioned by this proposal. Whatever enforcement challenges
reporting statutes may face, enforcement agents must first determine
which subjects are bound by statutory duties. The "any person" pro-
posal seeks to impose reporting duties as broadly as possible.
B. The Penn State Scandal: An "Any Person" Reporting Alternative
The recent convictions of a member of the Penn State University
football coaching staff for child sexual abuse illustrate the need of
''any person" reporting provisions in mandatory reporting statutes.
Jerry Sandusky, former defensive coordinator for the Penn State foot-
ball team, was convicted of over forty counts of "deviate sexual inter-
course" and "indecent contact" with victims under the ages of sixteen
and thirteen, respectively. Sandusky systematically abused ten differ-
ent victims over fifteen years. 274 According to his testimony given
before the grand jury, then-assistant coach Mike McQueary saw San-
dusky rape a child in the Penn State locker room showers in 2002, but
did not report the incident to the police. 275 Instead, McQueary re-
lated the incident to then-head coach Joe Paterno.276 Paterno failed
to report the incident to police, but instead went to the school's ath-
letic director.2 77 The Penn State athletic director also failed to dis-
close the incident to police. 278
Pennsylvania's mandatory reporting statute provides that "[a] per-
son who, in the course of employment, occupation or practice of a
profession, comes into contact with children shall report or cause a
report to be made ... when the person has reasonable cause to sus-
pect ... a child ... is a victim of abuse. ' 279 Employees of institutions
are required to report suspected incidents of abuse to the person in
273. See Franklin & Ploeger, supra note 272, at 1005 ("[P]otential liability [for tens or hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars] suggests that tort law may be far more threatening and burden-
some for many persons than criminal law.").
274. Kevin Johnson, Sandusky Faces Life in Prison After Conviction on 45 Charges, USA
TODAY, June 23, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/footballlstory/2012-06- 2 2 /san-
dusky-verdict/55768640/1.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. Athletic director Tim Curley and finance official Gary Schultz will be standing trial
on charges of lying to a grand jury concerning their knowledge of Sandusky's abuse of children.
Id.
279. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311(a) (2010).
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charge of the institution.280 This scandal, however, illuminates the
weakness of a reporting scheme that does not include an "any person"
provision. Had the Pennsylvania law contained such a provision, both
McQueary and Paterno would have been obligated to report the alle-
gations of abuse to police or a Pennsylvania agency of child protective
services, or face the possibility of criminal sanctions.281 Child protec-
tive services agencies and police departments, unlike a university ad-
ministrative body, are equipped to investigate the credibility of claims
and assess future risk to children. Thus, an "any person" provision in
the Pennsylvania statute would have broadened the base of those re-
quired to report and further incentivized those with knowledge of the
abuse to report it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of child abuse is heinous, affecting victims and society
in manifold ways. Abrogation of the clergy exemption from
mandatory reporting laws will advance the interests of at-risk chil-
dren. States that currently provide the exemption should carefully
consider the problems of ambiguity as they pertain to the unique na-
ture of the clergymember's identity and role. States should also care-
fully weigh the constitutional problems created by clergy exemptions.
The interests of at-risk children warrant abrogation of the exemption,
even if such abrogation impinges on certain rights of the penitent, be-
cause children are particularly vulnerable. Finally, states contemplat-
ing abrogation of the exemption would do well to also consider an
"any person" reporting provision. Such provisions commit the whole
community to the protection of those most in harm's way.
Paul Winters*
280. Id. § 6311(c).
281. In fact, anyone who witnessed or suspected abuse during the fifteen years in question
would have shared the legal obligation.
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